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of American history have written at length
S TUDENTS
concerning certain distinctive characteristics of the American people which have produced unique and recurring phenomena in the fields of politics, economics, and sociology.
Comparatively little, however, has been written about
the impact of the American character upon the over-all
history of military discipline, and in particular about the
unique and recurring phenomena in the public's reaction to
military discipline during and after major foreign wars.
From abundant evidence, we may safely generalize and
submit certain historical conclusions. The American people
have been slow and reluctant to enter war. Despite the
tFormer Dean, Catholic University Law School; Consultant, U.S. Navy;
Senior Member, Board for the Study of Disciplinary Practices and Procedures of the United States Navy (1953); Author of A STUDY OF FIVA
HUNDRED NAVAL PRISONERS AND NAVAL JUSTICE and MOBILIZATION, MORALE,

AND COMBAT SUCCESS IN THE UNITED STATES NAVY.
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problems posed in mobilizing a people accustomed to a wide
latitude of freedom and traditionally opposed to regimentation
of any kind, most citizens have responded willingly to a call
for sacrifice. The nation has occasionally suffered humiliation
through such incidents as the defections among some American prisoners in the Korean conflict. Yet in the overall
experiences of foreign wars, American youths have proved
themselves generous and courageous in their patriotism and
have exhibited an outstanding capacity for adjustment and
leadership.
Such united efforts of the military and civilian components have achieved great military success in hard fought
wars. Yet, paradoxically, after achieving such victories, the
American people, in a recurring pattern, have immediately
demanded instant and precipitous demobilization which has
seriously threatened military efficiency and discipline.
Finally, the American people, reacting to personal losses,
continuous worry and strain, and disturbed by the complaints
of returning servicemen, have lashed out indiscriminatively at
military authorities and have coupled their criticisms with
vociferous and violent demands on Congress for investigations
which would lead to basic reforms in the laws governing the
administration of military discipline.
Such a phenomenon occurred after the American Revolution. It was repeated after World War I and again after
World War II. In the early days of the Republic, such
resentment culminated in efforts to reform military discipline and courts-martial through a Committee appointed to
revise the Articles of War which governed Army discipline.
The Committee included Thomas Jefferson and John Adams.1
The American War Articles were borrowed from the
British Articles, which in turn were almost a literal translation of the Roman Articles. The attempt to reform could
hardly be called successful. Adams complained that Jefferson
threw all the labor, including debate, on him, and the reI Morgan,

The Background of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 6

L. Rav. 169 (1953). See also Address by E. M. Morgan before Maryland State Bar Association, 24 MD. STATE B. C. 195 (1919).
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sulting legislation of 1806 re-enacted the Articles without
substantial changes. A later attempt in 1874 accomplished
little more, for eighty-seven of the one-hundred and one
Articles remained unchanged and most of those remaining
were not altered substantially. An eminent authority, Edmund M. Morgan, has characterized such military discipline
as an attempt to subject an Army of citizens in uniform to a
system designed "to fit an army of professional soldiers
serving an empire for hire." 2 Though the Articles of War
were again subjected to revision in 1916, the result was more
a rearrangement and reclassification than a fundamental reform. Nor were the Articles for the Government of the Navy,
based largely upon the British Articles, substantially changed
-even in 1862 and subsequent thereto, the Articles remained
fundamentally the same as the corresponding British Articles
3
in theory and substance.
Thus, at the outset of World War I, both the Army and
Navy retained archaic systems of military justice poorly
equipped for the stresses of military discipline of a huge conscript as well as volunteer military force in a large scale
foreign war.
With victory over Germany achieved, the post-war pattern
of American reaction soon became evident. Once again the
public demanded, after World War I, a precipitous demobilization, and bitterly criticized the administration of military
justice. Mounting public feeling culminated again in aggressive efforts for reform. Among the protagonists in the World
War I controversy were John H. Wigmore, an eminent scholar
in jurisprudence and the law of evidence, defending the
military, and Edmund M. Morgan, then a young man, assuming the role of aggressive critic. It is noteworthy that
Mr. Morgan, later a distinguished professor at Harvard Law
School, served as the Chairman of the Committee appointed
by the Department of Defense to draft the Uniform Code of
Military Justice. The types of complaints after World War I
2Morgan Address, szpra note 1, at 200.

3 Morgan, The Background of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 6
L. REv. 169 (1953).
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formed an example which was to recur in much more dramatic
form after World War II.
Such complaints assumed a
standard pattern: unduly large numbers of men were courtmartialed, with an extremely high percentage of convictions
(88%) ; the award of sentences by courts-martial were excessive, resulting in the recommendations by Boards of Review
of reductions in some 77% of the noted cases; wide discrepancies existed in sentences for the same offense (contemptuous language was punishable by three months confinement in England, and twenty-five years in France; common
absence offenses varied from three months to ninety-nine
years) ; tyrannical practices of courts-martial; the poor calibre
of defense counsel; and, the most damning criticism of all,
official increases in sentences on appeal. The storm of controversy subsided without effective reforms. Indeed, the
practical results of these and later attempted reforms were
far from significant, with the result that the system of military
justice without modern reforms was grossly unprepared for
the problems of discipline arising in the global war when
the Army increased from 1,460,000 to 8,266,000, the Navy
from 220,000 to 4,758,000, and the sum total of persons subject to military discipline totalled some 12,300,000. The total
of military courts-martial approached some 600,000 per year
at the height of World Wrar II.
The astounding differences between prior wars and World
War II in the numbers of men involved, the global spread in
territory, the far-flung lines of various task forces, in some
areas affected by low morals and strange mores, and the
presence of a large number of youths already emancipated
from old fashioned family and neighborhood influences and
discipline--all were factors contributing to the vast increase
of courts-martial and disciplinary problems in World War II,
which resulted in about 1,700,000 courts-martial, over 100
even at the end of
capital executions, and the imprisonment,
4
the war, of some 45,000 servicemen.
4 MacCormick, Statistical Study of 241J00 Military Prisoners, 10 Fa.
PROB. 6 (No. 2 1946) ; Karlen & Papper, The Scope of Military Justice, 43 J.
CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 285 (1952); WHITE. A STUDY OF FIvE HUNDR M
NAVAL PRISONERS AND NAVAL JUSTICE

(1947).
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Once victory had been achieved in World War II, the
historic post-war pattern of the American Revolution and of
World War I recurred in a demand for court-martial reform
and a rising tide of criticism for the administration of military
discipline. The huge numbers involved in World War II
dwarfed by comparison the numbers involved in earlier wars,
and appeared to increase the number of complaints in geometric progression. The emotions suppressed during the long,
tense period of global warfare were now released by peace,
and erupted into a tornado-like explosion of violent feelings,
abusive criticism of the military, and aggressive pressures on
Congress for fundamental reforms in the court-martial system.
An understanding of this recurring historical pattern
and of the number and variety of complaints after World
War II is essential for any knowledge of the genesis of a
universal code unique in the world's military history. For it
is unique as an attempt to enact a fundamental law embracing for the first time all the military services, and
dedicated to attempting a balance between the preservation of
fundamental discipline as an indispensable basis of military
efficiency and the maintenance of the legal rights of military
personnel in a constitutional democracy emphasizing the dignity of the individual.
There may well be flaws in the Code which need correction. But to admit such a need does not postulate any
tolerance of the extreme view that the Code should be liquidated, or in the alternative, so weakened, as to amount
to a rejection of its historical necessity and fundamental
philosophy.
It would appear that a major cause of the erroneous
thinking of the latter school is a failure to understand and
appraise the forces which led to the Code's enactment. Admittedly in that post-war era, there was a failure to understand the logistic demands upon military authority in a
global war to enforce discipline and conduct courts-martial.
Nor could an unprejudiced critic fall to recognize some exaggerated, vicious, and even untruthful complaints. Anyone
familiar with the post-war period, including members of Congress who were deceived by false information, or, more often,
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given only partial information, would agree with James Forrestal. When questioned about the pre-code functioning of
military justice, he said, "I do not believe it is as bad as it
has been painted, nor as good as some of its defenders claim.
Many of the criticisms have seemed to me to be without foundation, but many of them have seemed to me to be justified." '
Even today, some extreme critics deny the historical need
for the Uniform Code of Military Justice, minimize the complaints, and belittle its proponents. In this they betray a
gross ignorance of American history and a culpable failure
to understand the political necessities of public confidence
in the fundamental fairness of courts-martial in our most
critical period-not war, not peace-but in a period in which
the national defense will need large numbers of young men
in the military forces for an indefinite period.
Therefore, it becomes useful to review and to gauge again
the numerous factors and forces which produced the Code.
At the outset it will be necessary to separate fact from myth.
For example, no myth has survived more successfully than
the often repeated fiction that the Doolittle Board Army reforms of 1946 slackened discipline and "led to a revision of
the Code of Military Justice [which was] a concession to
civilian pressures. . . ,,6 By an Army precept dated March

18, 1946, the Doolittle Board was directed to study officerenlisted personnel relationships in the Army.7 The evidence
included over a thousand letters as of April 30, 1946, witnesses in person, magazine and newspaper articles, and radio
commentaries. The Board procedures appeared haphazard
and uncritical, and the hearings provided a field day for
violent critics of the officer-enlisted personnel relationship.
The Board itself seemed to be intrigued -with the field of
"social behavior," where social distinctions imposed indignities
upon enlisted personnel. The Board stressed that it was in
5 Index and Legislative History-Uniform Code of Military Justice.
6Hanson N. Baldwin, Saturday Evening Post, Aug. 8, 1959, p. 13.
Reprinted in condensed form, Reader's Digest, Jan. 1960, p. 96. See also

Saturday Evening Post, July 30, 1955, p. 74; Saturday Evening Post, March
6, 1954, p. 64; N. Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1953, p. 23, col. 4.
7 The Doolittle Report, Infantry journal Press, Washington, D. C., June

1946, p. 7.
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this category that "abuses were most rampant, violations occurred most frequently, and irregularities were most apparent." To be sure, the Board did state that "the largest
differential, which brought the most criticism in every instance, was in the field of military justice and courts-martial
procedure which permitted inequities and injustices to enlisted personnel." 8 Moreover the Board recommended a "review of the machinery for administering military justice and
the courts-martial procedure with a view to making all
military personnel subject to the same types of punishment
as based upon infractions of rules and misdemeanors." I It
can readily be seen that this loose report centered upon
social differences, fell far short of any comprehensive investigation, and was totally lacking in any specific recommendations for legislative reforms. To attribute a dominating
influence to the Doolittle Report is to fall into the same error
as the Board itself-a fascination with the reform of social
amenities, salutes, and fraternization.
Conclusions contrasting in emphasis with those of the
Doolittle Board were to be drawn by the Code Committee
after months of study of a vast amount of evidence from a
variety of sources using different approaches, whose only
common denominator was an attitude deeply critical of the
war-time administration of military discipline, coupled with
an aggressive demand for a complete overhaul of the military
judicial system. Primary sources included numerous studies
hereinafter described, initiated by the armed services themselves from 1943 to 1947, large numbers of complaining letters to Congress and the White House, and numerous critical
articles in service and veteran magazines, as well as special
articles and editorials in newspapers including the New York
Times and the Herald Tribune. Added to these were hundreds
of printed pages of congressional hearings and debates.
Through convention resolutions from county to national
level, the appointment of special committees, and the delegation of official spokesmen to congressional committee hears Id. at
9

18.
Id. at 21.
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ings, legal associations and patriotic organizations threw their
prestige and political influence behind the support of the
controversial charges and the resulting demands for remedial
legislation. Included in the former were the American Bar
Association 10 and special committees on military justice of
the New York State Bar Association," the War Veterans
Bar Association, 12 and the New York County Lawyers Association. 13 Included in the latter group were the American
Legion, 14 the Veterans of Foreign Wars, 15 the Amvets, 16 the
National Guard Association, 17 the Reserve Officers' Association,' 8 and the Marine Corps Reserve Association.' 9
In 1945, Army Under-Secretary Patterson had attempted
to make comparisons favorable to the military courts-martial
over civilian trials, particularly in the matter of review and
clemency.2 0 But the ground swell of criticisms alleging
"caste," "discrimination," and "injustices" forced him to admit
the need for "overhauling" the Army Court-Martial system in
1946.21 As Secretary, he appointed the ineffective Doolittle
Board, and, shortly thereafter, the Vanderbilt Committee,
headed by the vigorous former President of the American
Bar Association, who was ably assisted by lawyers and
judges of wide experience and recognized integrity. This
Committee held advertised regional hearings culminating in
over twenty-five hundred pages of transcript, examined voluminous Army disciplinary studies, considered several hundred
pertinent questionnaires, and digested several hundred letters. 22 While the Committee found that "the innocent are
10 Hearings Before

the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed

Services, H. R. Rap. No. 2498, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 715 (1949)

[hereinafter

cited as 1949 Hearings]. See also Changes Advised in Courts-MartialSystem,
33 A.B.A.J. 40 (1947); Improving Military Justice, 33 A.B.A.J. 319 (1947).
111949 Hearings 836.
12 Id.at 646.

23 Id.
at 633. N. Y. Times, July 14, 1947, p. 9, col. 1.
141949

Hearings 661, 662.

15 Id. at 734.
16 Id.at 776.
17 Id. at 771.
'sId.at 831.
19 Id.at 699.
20 N. Y. Times, July 8, 1945, p. 10, col. 6.
21 N. Y. Times, March 26, 1946, p. 31, col. 8.
22
Report of War Department Advisory Committee on Military Justice to
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almost never convicted and the guilty seldom acquitted"a conclusion generally admitted to be true-the Committee
proceeded to indict the wartime administration of Army
justice in several vital areas.
The Committee found a "definite pattern of defects" and
concluded that the evidence justified these findings:
"1. There was an absence of sufficient attention to and
emphasis upon the military justice system, and lack of
preliminary planning for it.
2. There was a serious deficiency of sufficiently qualified
and trained men to act as members of the court or as
officers of the court.
3. The command frequently dominated the courts in the
rendition of their judgment.
4. Defense counsel were often ineffective because of (a)
lack of experience and knowledge, or (b) lack of a
vigorous defense attitude.
5. The sentences originally imposed were frequently excessively severe and sometimes fantastically so.
6. There was some discrimination between officers and
enlisted men, both as to the bringing of charges and as
to convictions and sentences.
7. Investigations, before referring cases to trial, were
frequently inefficient or inadequate." 23
The Navy had recognized earlier the difficulties of the
administration of justice in the war expansion. On June
25, 1943, the Secretary of the Navy requested Arthur A.
Ballantine, a distinguished lawyer with wide governmental
experience, to prepare a report on "the organization, methods,
and procedure of Naval Courts-with recommendations of
possible improvement-[in] handling the largely increased
the Secretary of War (1946). See also N. Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1946, p. 1,
col.234.
Report of War Department, supra note 22, at 3.
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volume of cases." 24 Because the study was conducted duing
the active period of warfare, the report was necessarily limited in scope. The report dealt principally with procedures,
but it also pointed out a "serious lack of standardization of
punishment" 25 and criticized the practice of the excessive
2
award of bad conduct discharges, though liberally remitted,
undue time lags between arrest and trial and later review, 7
8
and excessive sentences.

2

This last criticism was repeated in several later studies,
the chief of which was a study of wartime discipline in the
Navy by Vice Admiral Joseph K. Taussig. 29 Noting that in
a review of 1600 courts-martial, the sentence had been substantially mitigated in some 1200, Admiral Taussig concluded:
"There is no doubt but that, under the system which we
have followed for years, members of courts have generally
been unwilling to undergo the risk of criticism based on
supposed inadequacy of sentence which is inherent in attempting to fix a just and final measure of punishment. The
result has been that courts usually impose excessively severe
sentences which are mitigated with monotonous regularity." 30
The First Ballantine Report also stressed the need for improving the legal qualifications of all those participating in
the various phases of courts-martial, and recommended a
review of the whole subject after the war ended.s1
The Second Ballantine Report pursuant to precept of
November 15, 1945, dealt largely with the procurement,
qualification, and function of legal officers in the Navy. It
admitted that wartime experience indicated a need for
changes in the court-martial system.3 2 Such recommendations
245 First Ballantine Report, U. S. Navy (1943).
2 1d. at 13.
26 1d. at 12.
27
1d. at 7.
28 Id. at 10.
29 Naval War-Time Discipline, Report from United States Naval In-

stitute
Proceeding, July 1944, August 1944, October 1944.
301d. at 5.
s1 First Ballantine Report, U. S. Navy 5 (1943).
32 Second Ballantine Report, U. S. Navy 1 (1945).
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included some reforms proposed in the report of Judge Mathew
P. McGuire, a District of Columbia Federal Court Judge."
In addition to these general studies, the Navy made
available special reports including the Keefe Board Review
of general court-martial sentences,3 4 the Snedeker Report,
a comparative study of military disciplinary systems,35 and
the White Report, a study of "Five Hundred Naval
Prisoners and Naval Justice," which revealed a common pattern of complaints and concluded with specific recommendations for the improvement of Naval Justice.3 6 Rear
Admiral 0. S. Colclough, the Judge Advocate General of the
Navy, announced that the Navy would modernize the basic
laws for the government of the Navy and issue new rules for
courts-martial. Included in such proposals were Review
Boards with a civilian member, the division of duties between
the Judge Adovcate and the prosecuting (trial) counsel in a
court-martial, protection of courts-martial from interference,
and safeguards against unjust revocation of suspended
37
sentence.
The investigations, studies, and Congressional Hearings
of the post-war years dealing with such a comprehensive and
complex problem as military justice patently demanded a
calm, objective appraisal and a mature, constructive approach.
Yet stormy petrels, including some members of Congress,
stirred up bitterness with. sensational headlines in the press.
For example: "The Army has a rotten court-martial system
but the Navy's is worse"; 38 "Military Courts are guilty of
the grossest types of miscarriage of justice"; 1 "High Command accused of stacking courts against accused and refusing counsel of accused's choice" ;40 "Marked discrepancy
between justice to officers and enlisted men-a double stand3 Report of McGuire Committee to the Secretary of the Navy (1945).
34 Report of General Court-Martial Review Board (1947).
35 Report of Colonel James N. Snedeker, USMC to Judge Advocate General (1946).
ar WHITE, A
JusTIca (1947).

37

STUDY OF

FIVE HUNDRED

NAVAL
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N. Y. Times, June 22, 1947, p. 17, col. 1.

38 Rep. L. M. Rivers, World Telegram, April 14, 1947.
'3

Sen. Wayne Morse, N. Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1945, p. 8,col. 4.

40 Sen. William E. Jenner, N. Y. Times, July 9, 1947, p. 1, col. 7.
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The accuracy and fairness of such charges may be seriously questioned. But merely to deny or to question them
does not in the slightest degree minimize the terrific adverse
political impact of such charges on the public's confidence
in military justice.
Undoubtedly, such charges contributed to the bitterness
of the most controversial of all the questions relating to military courts-martial-"command control." In essence, "command control" refers to the power of the convening officer
to appoint the members of the court, the law officer, the trial
(prosecuting) counsel, and often the defense counsel. The
convening authority also reviews the findings of the courtmartial and has plenary power to cut down the punishment
and suspend a bad-conduct discharge. Moreover, he passes
upon the fitness reports of these officers and other incidental
matters, such as leave.
A sharp controversy ensued between those who believed
that Commanding Officers should be deprived of "command
control" and those who viewed such prerogatives as essential
to the orderly functioning of command. In the former group
were the American Bar Association, the Vanderbilt Committee, the New York County Bar Association, and the Bar
Association of the City of New York. 43 The New York State
Bar Association, however, took an aggressive stand in favor
of retaining "command control," and made much of General
Eisenhower's opposition to a divided command responsibility." That "command control" had been abused by interference in isolated cases could not be denied. The Vanderbilt
Committee found a deliberate attempt to influence the decision in many instances." A State Governor, later a Federal
Sen. M. R. Young, N. Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1946, p. 36, col. 3.
Rep. Leon H. Gavin, N. Y. Times, June 26, 1945, p. 20, col. 3.
43 N. Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1947, § 4, p. 8, col. 7. See also Letter to Committee on Uniform Code, Nov. 2, 1948.
44 Letter, Special Committee New York State Bar Association to Committee on Military Justice, Jan. 29, 1949, quoting Eisenhower speech, New
York Lawyer's Club, Nov. 17, 1948. See also N. Y. Times, March 1, 1949.
45 Vanderbilt Report, pp. 6-7, Dec. 13, 1946.
41
42
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Judge, informed the Committee on the Code that he was
dismissed as a member of a general court because of an
acquittal, and threatened with a lower efficiency rating as an
officer if he failed to convict in a greater number of cases.4 6
The deep impact of the alleged abuses of "command
control" is reflected in typical articles entitled "Can Military
Trials Be Fair?",47 and "Drumhead Justice", 48 as well as

in newspaper accounts and editorials such as those of the
New York Times and the New York Herald Tribune, which
provided ammunition for the all-out attack upon "command
control." 49 An amendment to deprive the convening officer
of "command control" passed the House of Representatives
on January 15, 1948, but failed to become law.
The Uniform Code has continued the retention of "command control." But it has placed a powerful proscription
against abuse by Article 37,50 which forbids any attempts to
coerce or influence courts-martial, including any type of
subsequent reprimand. Any violation subjects the offender
to a court-martial under Article 98(2).51 In no area is the
military in such a vulnerable position as in the abuse of
"command control," for the American people instinctively
strike out at any interference with the independence and
integrity of a court of justice.
It is, of course, impossible to appraise accurately the
many different factors which combined to bring about the
enactment of the Code. Some extreme criticisms and allegations of abuse were hardly credible. But, on the other
hand, an assertion that fundamental changes were not necessary ignored the accumulated evidence and the deep resent46 Letter From Governor E. Gibson to the Committee on the Code, Nov.
18, 1948.
47 2 STAN. L. REv. 547 (1950).
48
Reader's Digest, Aug. 1951, p. 39. See also Los Angeles Daily Journal,

Jan. 29, Feb. 4, 1946.

49 N. Y. Times, July 13, 1947, § 4, p. 8, col. 3; Feb. 9, 1949, p. 13, col. 1;
Feb. 10, 1949, p. 26, col. 3; Sept. 8, 1949, p. 21, col. 3; May 8, 1950, p. 22,
col. 3; N. Y. Herald Tribune, March 14, 1948; May 25, 1951. See also United
States v. Littrice, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 487, 491, 13 C.M.R. 43. 47 (1953); Ward,
UCMJ-Does It Work? 6 VAwD. L. REv. 186, 199 (1953).
so UCMJ art. 37, 10 U.S.C. § 837 (1958).

51UCMJ art. 98(2), 10 U.S.C. § 898(2) (1958).
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ment voiced not only by the people in general, but by some
conservative members of the Federal Judiciary. Since state
courts lack jurisdiction, courts-martial decisions were attacked
in the federal courts, usually by habeas corpus proceedings.
The federal law had traditionally refused to revise the decisions of courts-martial, thereby narrowing the grounds of
appellate review to a claim that the decision was void on
account of an absolute want of power, rather than voidable
52
because of the defective exercise of power.
No legal authority would deny that federal courts, enraged by flagrant abuses in some courts-martial, did in fact
enlarge their jurisdiction to include collateral attack. A
respected authority has warned that even the restoration by
the Supreme Court of the narrower traditional rule and
provisions of the Code itself will not prevent federal judges
from assuming jurisdiction and reviewing any such flagrant
53
abuses.
Out of the charges and denials, the extended hearings of
committees in and out of Congress, the proposals of extremists criticizing and defending the military, and the multiple
pressures of various legal and patriotic organizations, emerged
a new fundamental law, unique in the world's history-a law
which attempted to reconcile and balance the "justice element
and the military element" in the American Constitutional
Democracy.5 4 In announcing the enactment of the law to
become effective May 3, 1951, the Defense Department stated:
(1)

It creates a system of justice which is uniform for
all the armed services;

(2) It contains many new provisions designed to assure
the accused a fair trial and to prevent undue control
of or interference with the administration of justice;
(3)

52

It presents the basic military law in a well-organized,
readily understandable form.65

Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365, 401 (1902).

53 Pasley, The Federal Courts Look at the Court-Martial, 12 U. PiTT. L.

REv. 7 (1950).
54 Brosman, The Court: Freer than Most, 6 VAND. L. REv. 166, 167 (1953).
55 Department of Defense Press Release, May 5, 1950.
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Such were the promises of this new and unique Uniform
Code of Military Justice hammered out on the anvil of Congressional Hearings and debate into final legislation effective
May 31, 1951. To implement such promises, the Code required, among other protections, that charges and specifications be signed under oath.5 6 It forbade the questioning of a
suspect without prior warning as to his right to refuse to
answer,57 limited the authority to pre-trial arrest or confinement,5 8 and required "immediate steps" to inform and to try
or dismiss the charges,5 9 while, at the same time, providing
against undue haste in the trial of the accused. 60
It also prohibited interference with the independence of
the court-martial, 6 1 and granted the right to challenge court
members peremptorily as well as for cause.62 It stipulated
the number of members on courts-martial, 63 and included the
accused's right to enlisted members. 64 It further provided
for the method of voting on guilt,65 and set the effective date
at which a sentence would begin to run. 6 6
Moreover, specific provisions protected the accused
against double jeopardy,6" provided a statute of limitations,6 8
and banned unusual and cruel punishments. 69 In specific
terms, the Code guaranteed the presumption of innocence 70
and placed the burden on the prosecution to prove guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.7 1
Of equal importance with providing such substantive
guarantees was the further necessity of insuring their im56

UCMJ art. 30, 10 U.S.C. §830 (1958).
57UCMJ art. 31, 10 U.S.C. §831 (1958).
58UCMJ art. 9, 10 U.S.C. § 809 (1958); UCMJ art. 10, 10 U.S.C.

(1958).
" UCMJ art. 10,
6OUCMJ art 35,
61UCMJ art. 37,
§ 898(2) (1958).
62UCMJ art. 41,
63UCMJ art. 16,

10 U.S.C. § 810 (1958).
10 U.S.C. § 835 (1958).
10 U.S.C. §837 (1958); UCMJ art. 98(2), 10 U.S.C.
10 U.S.C. § 841 (1958).
10 U.S.C. § 816 (1958).

64 UCMJ art. 25(c) (1), 10 U.S.C. § 825(c) (1) (1958).
65UCMJ art. 51(a), 10 U.S.C. §851(a) (1958).
66 UCMJ art. 57, 10 U.S.C. § 857 (1958).
67UCMJ art. 44, 10 U.S.C. §844 (1958).
" UCMJ art. 43, 10 U.S.C. § 843 (1958).
69

§810

UCMJ art. 55, 10 U.S.C. §855 (1958).

70UCMJ art. 52(1), 10 U.S.C. §852(1) (1958).
71UCMJ art. 51(4), 10 U.S.C. § 851(4) (1958).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 35

plementation by competent and legally qualified personnel in
all stages of the proceedings, including investigation, trial,
and review. Prior to convening a general court-martial, the
convening authority is required to refer the charges to his
Staff Judge Advocate or Legal Officer for advice.72 Nor
shall the charges be referred to a general court-martial unless
there has first been an investigation at which the accused is
entitled to be present and represented by counsel. 73 In a
general court-martial, both prosecuting (trial) and defense
counsel must be qualified; 7 4 and, in a special court-martial,
the accused is entitled to qualified counsel automatically if
75
the trial counsel is qualified.
In addition, the Code provided for a qualified Law Officer for every general court-martial.7 6 He controls the conduct of the proceedings and rules on the admissibility of
evidence and interlocutory matters. His functions have been
compared to those of a Judge in a civil or criminal case,
including the duty to instruct the court as to the elements
of the offense, the presumption of innocence, and the burden
of proof, though he does not himself vote on the question
of guilt or the sentence to be adjudged. 7
While the drastic demobilization after World War II reduced the Armed Forces by several millions, the crisis in
Korea reversed the trend, and required the recalling of
thousands of reserves and substantial increases in the draft
quotas. The annual total of courts-martial, including general,
special, and summary (but excluding non-judicial punishment
under Article 15 for which there are no available figures),
increased by over 100,000 from 1951 to 1952-53, the peak
year of the ten-year period 1951-1961. In the latter year,
there were 310,501 courts-martial. Some estimate of the size
of the disciplinary problem in the Armed Services can be
72UCMJ art. 34(a), 10 U.S.C. § 83 4 (a) (1958).

73UCMJ art. 32(b), 10 U.S.C. § 832(b) (1958).
74UCMJ art. 27(b), 10 U.S.C. § 827(b) (1958).
75 UCMJ art. 27(c) (1), 10 U.S.C. §827(c) (1) (1958).
7OUCMJ art. 26, 10 U.S.C. § 826 (1958).
77 UCMJ art. 26, 10 U.S.C. § 826 (1958); UCMJ art. 51(c), 10 U.S.C.

§851(c) (1958).
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made from the Annual Report of the Court of Military
Appeals: 78
Total Court-Martial cases:
May 31, 1951-January 1, 1959 ....................
Cases Reviewed by Boards of Review ......
Cases Docketed with U.S. Court of Military Appeals ......................................
U.S. Court of Military Appeals Decisions

1,743,239
119,802
12,642
1,368

Subsequent figures would bring the total number of courtsmartial to about 2,000,000 for the 1951-1961 period, with
127,314 cases considered by the Boards of Review, and
about 15,000 cases docketed with the Court of Military
79
Appeals.
Though the trend in the number of disciplinary cases
has been steadily and substantially downward, the latest available figures for the last two years, respectively, total 130,458
and 122,713 courts-martial.8 0
Ten years have now passed since the enactment of the
Code. The cumulative experience under the Code is reflected in the twelve volumes (totalling over 9,000 pages)
of the opinions of the Court of Military Appeals, the twentyeight volumes of Court of Military Appeals Opinions and
selected Board of Review Decisions, the Annual Reports of
the Judges Advocate of the separate services, and the past
and present suggestions for revision of the Code, varying from
slight corrective measures to proposals which could approach
fundamental repeal.
At this point in the Code's history, the first decade
provides a sufficient period of time and accumulation of
experience for a reliable appraisal of the results of the Code
"in operation." St. John's Law School, under the leadership
of Dean Harold F. McNiece, has chosen THE UNIFORM CODE
OF MI ITARY

JUSTIC--ITs PROMISE

AND PERFORM[ANCE

78 [1958] ANN. REP. OF U.S.C.M.A. exhibit B, p. 31.
79

Figures submitted by Armed Services.

80 These figures are for fiscal year July 1-June 30.

as

214

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 35

the subject of public observance of Law Day 1961. The
school has brought together a number of eminent authorities
who have collaborated in bringing the several important factors
of such an appraisal into focus, in the hope that such a
review will provide an authentic historical survey as well
as possibly offering some constructive suggestions for legislative changes and administrative improvements. Such an
effort is well worth while as a contribution to the study of
contemporary American law. In a deeper sense, this symposium has added significance as a pledge of support to the
living symbol of even-handed and humane justice in the
American Armed Services, maintaining military discipline as
the essential foundation of national strength in a critical era
of American history.

